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Abstract. In De visione Dei’s preface, a multidimensional, embodied experience 
of the second-person perspective becomes the medium by which Nicholas 
of Cusa’s audience, the benedictine brothers of Tegernsee, receive answers 
to questions regarding whether and in what sense mystical theology’s divine 
term is an object of contemplation, and whether union with God is a matter 
of knowledge or love. The experience of joint attention that is described in this 
text is enigmatic (paradoxical, resisting objectification), dynamic (enactive, 
participatory), integrative (cognitive and affective), and transformative (self-
creative). As such, it instantiates the coincidentia oppositorum and docta 
ignorantia which, for Cusa, alone can give rise to a vision of the infinite.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
In the fall of 1452, Kaspar Ayndorffer – Abbot of the benedictine cloister 
of St. Quirin in Tegernsee – wrote a letter to Nicholas of Cusa in which he 
asked the cardinal for clarification on the relationship between knowledge 
[intellectus] and love [affectus] in the path toward union with God.1 As 
m.l. Führer has shown, this question – which was debated among late 
medieval and renaissance theologians such as Hugh of balma, Jean 
Gerson, and Vincent of Aggsbach – was intricately connected with what 
ernst Cassirer has called the renaissance’s ‘subject-object problem’.2 As 
1 edmond Vansteenberghe, ‘la correspondence de Nicolas de Cuse avec Gaspard 
Aindorffer et bernarde de Waging’, letter 3 in Autour de la docte ignorance: Une 
controverse sur la théologie mystique au XVe siècle, beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
des mittelalters (münster: Aschendorff, 1915), XIV, p. 110.
2 m.l. Führer, ‘The Consolation of Contemplation in Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione 
Dei’, in Nicholas of Cusa on Christ and the Church, ed. by Gerald Christianson and 
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it bore on the theory and practice of contemplation, the subject-object 
dilemma was this: Does mystical knowledge of God involve sentience of 
God as divine object apprehended by the rational faculties? or, rather, 
does such knowledge so obfuscate the felt distinction between the human 
mind and God that the divine cannot be seen but only indwelled and 
loved? When Cusa wrote De visione Dei (‘On the Vision of God’, hereafter 
DvD)3 in late 1453, he did so in large part to address the monks’ concerns 
and confusions over this core question. 
my wager in this essay is that attending to the rich and subtle ways 
in which the second-person perspective (hereafter SPP) permeates DvD 
will shed important light on Cusa’s method of addressing the theological 
puzzles that corresponded to the renaissance’s subject-object problem. 
Although this suffusion is evident throughout the treatise, it is most potent 
in DvD’s unique preface – the ‘zero degree’ of the work that ‘serves as 
basis for all the chapters the follow’.4 Attending (with an eye to both form 
and content) to the suffusion of the SPP in the preface will demonstrate 
that, in DvD, a multi-dimensional experience of relationality becomes 
itself the answer to the theological queries the Tegernsee community had 
posed to Cusa.
How could an experience of the SPP begin to solve the complicated 
question of whether and in what sense God is an object of contemplation? 
let us begin by noting that, for Cusa, God is as God acts. In De Docta 
Ignorantia, for example, Cusa figures the divine as gerund  – infinite 
Thomas m. Izbicki (leiden: brill, 1996), pp. 221-240; ernst Cassirer, The Individual and 
the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. by mario Domandi, rev. edn (mineola, New 
York: Dover Publications, 2000), pp. 123-191.
3 For the latin I  have consulted Jasper Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical 
Mysticism: Text, Translation and Interpretive Study of De Visione Dei (minneapolis, mN: 
The Arthur J. banning Press, 1985). english renderings of the text are from H. lawrence 
bond’s translation in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings (New York, NY and 
mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 235-289.
4 michel De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’, Diacritics 17, no. 3 (Autumn 1987), 
2-38 (p. 11).
5 De Docta Ignorantia (On Learned Ignorance) II.3.107, in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected 
Spiritual Writings, trans. by H. lawrence bond (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1997), 
pp. 86-206 (p. 135).
6 De apice theoriae (On the Summit of Contemplation). Here Cusa indicates that some 
of his earlier works (among them DvD), when properly understood, show the same basic 
understanding of God as presented in this, his final work (viz., God as Posse Ipsum). ¶ 16, 
in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings, trans. by H. lawrence bond (New York, 
NY and mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 293-303 (p. 300).
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becoming: ‘God [...] is the enfolding (complicatio) of all in the sense that 
all are in God, and God is the unfolding (explicatio) of all in the sense 
that God is in all.’5 In his final work, Cusa names God Posse Ipsum6 – 
pure possibility, the ‘“Can” before, behind, and present in all that “is”’.7 
Furthermore, for Cusa, this God who makes possible and subsists within 
the world’s unfurling cannot be thought, named, or experienced except 
via docta ignorantia, learned ignorance, wherein subtle dialectical 
reasoning reveals God’s unknowability and impossibility to be theology’s 
positive content. learned ignorance is achieved through the coincidentia 
oppositorum, the coincidence of opposites, a  theological method that 
‘resolves contradictions without violating the integrity of the contrary 
elements and without diminishing the reality or the force of their 
contradiction’.8 In DvD’s preface, I  argue, it is the phenomenon of the 
SPP which functions as the experiential vehicle that carries ignorance 
and coincidence, and, in so doing, serves to answer the monks’ core 
question about whether mystical theology’s divine term is apprehended 
along subject-object lines, and whether that apprehension is a  matter 
of love or knowledge. like the divine infinity of which Cusa speaks, 
second-person relationality is experienced as enigmatic (paradoxical; 
non-objectifiable), dynamic (active; participatory process), integrative 
(holistic; uniting cognitions and affections) and transformative (creative; 
self-forming).
II. DeFINITIoNAl AND meTHoDoloGICAl CoNSIDerATIoNS
The mode of interpersonal relatedness called ‘second-personal’ has, in 
recent years, been closely associated with phenomena denoted by the 
term ‘joint attention’. Diverse modes of joint attention are commonplace, 
but often studied in relatively ‘pure’, since uncluttered, forms in parent-
child interactions such as pointing, gaze-following, and reciprocal turn-
taking. With Andrew Pinsent, I  think Peter Hobson’s phrase ‘share[d] 
awareness of the sharing of the focus’9 is a  helpful (because clear yet 
broad) specification of ‘joint attention’, which, for reasons Pinsent 
7 H. lawrence bond, ‘Introduction’, in Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Spiritual Writings, ed. 
by H. lawrence bond (New York/mahwah: Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 3-84 (p.57).
8 bond, ‘Introduction’, p. 22.
9 Andrew Pinsent, The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’ Ethics: Virtues and Gifts 
(New York and london: routledge, 2012), p. 43. Peter Hobson, ‘What Puts Jointness into 
Joint Attention?’ in Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy 
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has highlighted, is often used interchangeably with ‘second-person 
perspective’. To my mind, this close association is usually not problematic 
as long as (1) it is acknowledged that the focus of subjects’ joint attention 
can be either each other, (an) outside object(s), or a combination of these; 
and (2) following Vasudevi reddy’s suggestion, language is changed 
from ‘attention’ to ‘attending’, for the second-person phenomenon is 
a dynamic, embodied, relational process rather than a static mental state 
in the mind of a single detached observer.10 reddy’s argument is in line 
with others in psychology and social neuroscience critiquing spectator 
theories of social knowing (rooted in cognitivist paradigms) and calling 
instead for models that are based on emotional and interactional 
engagements between subjects, rather than mental states associated with 
mere observation of one person by another.11
With regard to method, the interpretive approach employed in the 
present study is based in Paul ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology. In 
his Symbolism of Evil, ricoeur discusses ways in which mythic forms of 
discourse constitute the ‘verbal envelope of a form of life, felt and lived 
before being formulated.’ myths and other forms of poetic language are, 
he claims, ‘broken expressions of a  living participation in an  original 
Act’  – expressions which refer readers ‘back to an  experience lying at 
a lower level than any narration or any gnosis’. A reader’s access to this 
experience comes by way of ‘sympathetic imagination’ – a ‘re-enactment’ 
in which the interpreter ‘adopts provisionally the motivations and 
intentions’ of the subjectivity (or subjectivities) figured by the text. 
mystical texts are often deeply mythic and poetic, and Cusa’s DvD is 
no exception.12 It therefore admits of precisely the interpretive tactic 
just outlined. Thus, in ricoeurean form, I aim carefully to surface the 
phenomenological features of the experience to which DvD attests 
through an  imaginative and interdisciplinary recovery of the ‘initial 
and Psychology, ed. by Naomi eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa mcCormack, and Johannes 
roessler (oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 185-204 (p. 185).
10 Vasudevi reddy, ‘A Gaze at Grips With me’, in Joint Attention: New Developments in 
Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. by Axel Seeman (Cambridge, 
mA: The mIT Press, 2011), pp. 137-157.
11 on this topic, the literature is vast; a  helpful and up-to-date starting point is: 
leonard Schilbach, bert Timmermans, Vasudevi reddy, Alan Costall, Gary bente, 
Tobias Schlicht, and Kai Vogeley, ‘Toward a  Second-Person Neuroscience’, Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 36 (2013), 393-462.
12 Paul ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, trans. by emerson buchanan (New York: Harper 
and row, 1967), pp. 166, 167, 6, 19.
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event’ of the discourse. I maintain a cautious eye to the ‘distanciation’ 
between (on the one hand) DvD’s initial Sitz-im-Leben and (on the other 
hand) the way the work appears to my contemporary eyes; however, 
I  also acknowledge the possible fruitfulness of risking a  ‘new event 
of discourse’ made possible by the ‘range of interpretations’ that that 
very distanciation opens up.13 my interpretation is attuned to textual 
attestations of the experience(s) of implied author and implied readers, 
and is informed by multiple disciplines, including theology, philosophy, 
psychology, and neuroscience.
III. THe SeCoND-PerSoN PerSPeCTIVe 
IN DE VISIONE DEI’S PreFACe
Imagine the surprise at St. Quirin when Cusa’s long-awaited manuscript 
arrived with an extra item – a painting of an all-seeing face, probably 
Christ’s. In DvD’s preface, Cusa guides the monks through a  quasi-
liturgical exercise revolving around the painting he sent to Tegernsee 
along with his treatise. Cusa describes the portrait’s omnivoyant face as 
a similitude which, when meditated upon in the manner he describes, 
will give rise to a vision of the invisible.
In the greeting immediately preceding the preface, Cusa addresses 
the Tegernsee monks directly as dilectissimis fratribus, ‘dearest brothers’, 
informing them that his explicit aim is to reveal or make known [pando] 
to them the facility [facilitatem] of mystical theology. How will this 
revelation occur? ‘[b]y means of a very simple and commonplace method 
I will attempt to lead you [vos] experientially [experimentaliter] into the 
most sacred darkness.’14 A kind of SPP relation between implied authorial 
subject and implied reader-subjects is thus grafted into the treatise’s formal 
structure from the very start. The joint focus of the relation is movement 
toward the sacred darkness, but from different vantage points: the author 
leads through writing, and the audience follows through reading. And 
yet the obvious spatial and temporal separations between author and 
readers mean that it is a deeply ambiguous relation, constituted as much 
13 Paul ricoeur, ‘Philosophy and religious language’, in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, 
Narrative, and Imagination, trans. by David Pellauer, ed. by mark I. Wallace (minneapolis, 
mN: Fortress Press, 1995), pp. 35-47 (p. 38).
14 DvD, ¶ 1. Citations will follow H. lawrence bond’s numbering system, which 
divides the treatise into chapters and paragraphs. As the greeting and preface precede the 
first chapter, references to them cite paragraph numbers only.
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by invisibility and absence as by intimate, reciprocally-aware presence. 
Sharing or jointness, note Hobson and Hobson, ‘requires connectedness 
and differentiation between [at least] two people (with minds)’;15 surely 
this requirement is met at a basic level. Yet the incongruous timetable and 
lack of a clear sense of the other’s presence render the engagement16 less 
than straightforward. Yet, as will become increasingly apparent, the deep 
enigma of relationality is a key part of Cusa’s overall theological point.
In the preface, Cusa tells the brothers that the painting of the all-
seeing figure will help him in his efforts to ‘transport [vehere] you [vos] 
to divine things by human means’.17 The engine of the transport Cusa 
means to elicit is, I argue, the SPp. In DvD’s preface, the experience of 
mystical theology emerges slowly from the folds of a subtle and fecund 
relational matrix. ultimately it is the mysteries that inhere within the 
act-event of attending jointly (through, e.g., bodily coordination, gaze, 
mentalization, dialogue around shared experience) which constitute the 
conditions for an experienced revelation, the intellectual and emotional 
impact of which will begin to address the brothers’ deep theological 
concerns.
3.1 The First Phase
The preface’s exercise consists of three distinct yet interrelated moments 
or phases.18 The first corresponds with Cusa’s instructions to the monks to:
Hang this up some place, perhaps on a north wall. And you brothers [vos 
fratres] stand around it, equally distant from it, and gaze at it. And each 
of you will experience that from whatever place one observes it the face 
will seem to regard him alone. To a brother standing in the east, the face 
15 Peter Hobson and Jessica Hobson, ‘Joint Attention or Joint engagement? Insights 
from Autism’, in Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, 
and Social Neuroscience, ed. by Axel Seeman (Cambridge, mA: The mIT Press, 2011), 
pp. 115-135 (p. 120).
16 For De Jaegher et al., ‘engagement’ – defined as ‘the qualitative aspect of a social 
interaction as it starts to “take over” and acquire a momentum of its own’ – can transpire 
even if the experience of another person being there is ambiguous. The authors also 
concede that the ‘relational dynamics’ of the ‘coupling’ of ‘autonomous agents’ can 
happen on quite different levels as well as timescales. Hanne De Jaegher, ezequiel Di 
Paolo, and Shaun Gallagher, ‘Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?’, 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, no. 10 (oct. 2010), 441-447 (pp. 441, 442, 443).
17 DvD, ¶ 2.
18 michel De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’.
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will look eastward; to one in the south, it will look southward; and to one 
in the west, westward. First, therefore, you will marvel [admirari] at how 
it is possible that the face looks on all and each one of you at the same 
time. For the imagination of the one who is standing in the east cannot 
conceive that the icon’s gaze is turned in any other direction, such as the 
west or south.19
upon commencement of the ritual described in this passage, observe 
how the dimensionality of shared awareness of the sharing of the focus 
multiplies considerably, going far beyond the imperfect author-reader 
relation earlier discussed. mere preparation for the ritual  – that is, 
the cooperative act of creating a semicircle around the icon with each 
brother placed equidistantly in relation to it – demands shared attention 
to, at minimum: the treatise’s instructions (read or spoken), bodies (one’s 
own and others’), the painting, and a common idea of what the space will 
look and feel like when everyone is in place. As they get in formation, the 
brothers’ embodied, mutually-aware relations create a container for what 
will become a shared experience of the uncontained.
once begun, the meditation itself soon produces a  room full 
of immobile admirers  – in De Certeau’s terms, a  ‘simultaneity of 
stupefactions’. The all-seeing eyes of the portrait’s face are a point whose 
vectors ‘implant’ in each spectator,20 forming with each one a captivating 
relation experienced as exclusive and inimitable.21 Cusa later says that 
this undividedly attentive gaze, which ‘never abandons anyone’,22 looks 
19 DvD, ¶ 3.
20 De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’, p. 15.
21 As mcGinn notes (‘Seeing and Not Seeing’), the common link between divinity and 
visio in Platonic-inspired Christian theologies can be observed in (among many others) 
meister eckhart and William of St. Thierry, both of whose writings Cusa engaged. The 
roots of this connection can probably be traced to two main sources: first, Paul, who had 
utilized language of face to face vision, beholding, and transformation in his letters to the 
church at Corinth (1 Cor. 13:12; 2 Cor. 3:18); second, Plotinus, who had indicated that the 
essence of intellectual principle (nous) is movement toward the good through coincident 
seeing and being-seen (Ennead V.6.5). bernard mcGinn, ‘Seeing and Not Seeing: Nicholas 
of Cusa’s De Visione Dei in the History of Western mysticism’, in Cusanus: The Legacy of 
Learned Ignorance, ed. by Peter J. Casarella (Washington, DC: The Catholic university of 
America Press, 2006), pp. 27-53. For a comparison between Plotinus and Cusa on visio, 
see Werner beierwaltes, Visio facialis – Sehen ins Angesicht. Zur Coincidenz des endlichen 
und unendlichen Blicks bei Cusanus, Phil.-hist. Klasse. Sitzungsberichte Jahrgant 1988, 
Heft 1 (munich: bayerische Akademie de Wissenshaften, 1988).
22 DvD V.15.
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on all things for the express purpose of bringing each one into its best 
possible state of existence.23 Within this intimate and life-formative 
experience, it is reasonable to suppose that there are phenomenological 
similarities to what developmental psychologist Vasudevi reddy calls the 
‘gaze at grips with me’, which forms, in infancy, the basis for attentional 
abilities later in life.24 ‘[T]his ability to feel gaze to self ’, argues reddy, 
‘is crucial for further development of the meaning of attention.’25 For 
reddy, the roots of what it means to establish a relation between subject 
and object are in the feeling of the gaze directed toward the self. In this 
first moment of Cusa’s para-liturgy, wherein each monk is asked to sense 
himself as the object of an infinitely caring, non-abandoning divine sight, 
there is, I think, a kind of re-entrance into what D.W. Winnicott called 
‘transitional space’ – a primordial relational sensibility in which ‘subject’ 
and ‘object’ are two sides of one emergent, creative process. To begin to 
understand what it means to attend to mystical theology’s divine object, 
one must re-enter  – via disciplined, contemplative imagination  – the 
paradoxical yet self-formative space of the ‘gaze at grips with me’.
Yet, if the icon is to mediate a vision of infinity, the gaze cannot remain 
so particularized. each brother is thus asked to direct his imagination 
to the perspectives of other exercitants who are placed variously 
around the perimeter. Here it may prove fruitful to venture educated 
hypotheses regarding brain networks involved in this kind of mental 
act. Contemporary social neuroscience has shed some light on neural 
networks involved in attending to an object whilst maintaining explicit 
23 DvD IV.9.
24 reddy’s research on early infant interpersonal interactions has added to the 
growing body of evidence suggesting that infants as young as two months of age respond 
emotionally to attention directed to the self. Vasudevi reddy, ‘on being an object of 
Attention: Implications for Self-other Consciousness’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7, 
no. 9 (Sept. 2003), pp. 397-402; Vasudevi reddy, How Infants Know Minds (Cambridge, 
mA: Harvard university Press, 2008). reddy’s research complements neurological 
studies showing young babies’ remarkable sensitivity to mutual gaze. Direct gaze has 
been correlated with enhanced cortical arousal in infants as young as 4-months, and has 
also been associated with enhanced neural processing of emotional expressions in babies 
of the same age. See, respectively, Teresa Farroni, Gergely Csibra, Francsca Simion, 
and mark H. Johnson, ‘eye Contact Detection in Humans from birth’, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 99, no. 14 (July 2002), 9602-9605; Tricia Striano, 
Franziska Kopp, Tobias Grossmann, and Vincent m. reid, ‘eye Contact Influences 
Neural Processing of emotional expressions in 4-month old Infants’, Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience 1, no. 2 (2006), 87-94.
25 Vasudevi reddy, ‘A Gaze at Grips With me’, p. 144.
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awareness of (an)other’s attending to the same object. Several studies 
have demonstrated activation of the medial frontal cortex, particularly 
the ventral and dorsal regions, during joint attending.26 Such activation, 
it is hypothesized, may correspond both to the monitoring of emotions 
in the self and the other as well the monitoring and predicting of actions 
(one’s own and others’).27 Attending jointly, then, appears to activate 
brain areas responsible for both emotional and evaluative processing. 
based on this research, we might hypothesize that the Tegernsee 
monks, as they take up the invitation to attend to both the self ’s and the 
other’s perspective(s) in relation to the icon’s gaze, enter an experiential 
space marked by both emotional processing and cognitive appraisal – 
an integration of affectus and intellectus.
In the first phase of the ritual, then, the monks enter an ‘interpersonally 
coordinated affective [and cognitive] state’28 which serves to open up 
a  new perception of the painting. As each brother contemplates the 
perspective of self, other, and the gaze, he begins to experience the 
omnivoyant face as an iconic window onto the coincident eternality and 
temporality, finitude and infinity, of the divine. The SPP has, moreover, 
formed a  space wherein the brothers’ own relationally-constituted 
minds and bodies become instantiations of innumerable coincidences 
of opposites.29
3.2 The Second Phase
The next phase of the exercise introduces movement. The brothers are 
instructed to fix their eyes on the gaze while walking from west to east, 
26 David m. Amodio and Chris D. Frith, ‘meeting of minds: The medial Frontal 
Cortex and Social Cognition’, Nature Reviews Neuroscience 7, no. 4 (2006), 268-277; 
leonhard Schilbach, marcus Wilms, Simon b. eickhoff, Sandro romanzetti, ralf Tepest, 
Gary bente, N. Jon Shah, Gereon r. Fink, and Kai Vogeley, ‘minds made for Sharing: 
Initiating Joint Attention recruits reward-related Neurocircuitry’, Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience 22, no. 12 (2010), 2702-2715.
27 Amodio and Frith, ‘meeting of minds’; Chris D. Frith and uta Frith, ‘The Neural 
basis of mentalizing’, Neuron 50, no. 4 (2006), 531-534; Schilbach et al., ‘minds made for 
Sharing’.
28 Hobson and Hobson, ‘Joint Attention or Joint engagement?’, p. 116.
29 This prefigures the theme of contemplator-as-icon, which will emerge more 
explicitly later in the treatise. on this topic see H. lawrence bond, ‘The “Icon” and the 
“Iconic Text” in Nicholas of Cusa’s De Visione Dei I-XVII’, in Nicholas of Cusa and His 
Age: Intellect and Spirituality, ed. by Thomas m. Izbicki and Christopher m. bellitto 
(leiden: brill, 2002), pp. 177-97.
154 ANDreA HollINGSWorTH
and then back again from east to west, in opposite directions. In so 
doing, each:
will discover that the icon’s gaze continuously follows him. And if he 
returns from east to west, it will likewise not leave him. He will marvel 
[admirari] at how its gaze was moved, although it remains motionless, 
and his imagination will not be able to grasp [capere] how it is moved 
in the same manner with someone coming forth to meet him from the 
opposite direction.30
Silent awe attends the experience of being uninterruptedly followed by 
a physically immobile moving gaze. bewilderment is, moreover, doubled 
as the brothers are asked to imagine the perspective of other brothers 
walking in opposite directions; for they, too, experience the gaze’s 
uncannily fluid fixity.
The SPP profoundly shapes the contours of this experience. At a basic 
level, the exercise demands attention be paid to one’s own movement 
and one’s own gaze. but the icon’s stationary-yet-peripatetic eyes 
represent another kind of aware and attentive ‘other’, and it is awareness 
of this other’s constant awareness of one’s own movement (and gaze) 
which becomes a  key source of astonishment. Additionally, when the 
exercitant’s imagination attempts to grasp the perspective of another 
brother who is focused on the icon’s eyes (and on whom the icon’s eyes 
are focused), but moving in the opposite direction, a yet deeper sense of 
awe sets in, for there now emerges a confounding ‘co-possibility of two 
meanings ... which are opposites’.31 Here, theological meaning – namely, 
the coincidence of opposites, the ideal of which is, for Cusa, Christ – 
emerges out of the feeling of bodily movement in an attuned relational 
context. Such movement is reminiscent of what psychobiologist Colwyn 
Trevarthen calls ‘synrhythmicity’ between infant and caregiver – that is, 
closely engaged, cooperative ‘brain-generated rhythms of intentional and 
emotional movement’.32 This ‘synrhythmic regulation’, posits Trevarthen, 
30 DvD, ¶ 3.
31 De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’, p. 16.
32 Colwyn Trevarthen, ‘The Generation of Human meaning: How Shared experience 
Grows in Infancy’, in Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of 
Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. by Axel Seeman (Cambridge, mA, london, england: 
The mIT Press, 2011), pp.  73-113 (p. 85). Cf. Colwyn Trevarthen, Kenneth Aitken, 
marie Vandekerckhove, Jonathan Delafield-butt, and emese Nagy, ‘Collaborative 
regulations of Vitality in early Childhood: Stress in Intimate relationships and Postnatal 
Psychopathology’, in Developmental Psychopathology: Vol. 2. Developmental Neuroscience 
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gives rise to the infant’s later propensity to engage in ritual play, games with 
objects, shared tasks, and eventually symbols, naming, and discourse.33 
If Trevarthen is right that early intersubjective synrhythmic regulation 
becomes the bedrock for later cognitively-complex acts of imagination, 
self-awareness, and shared meaning, then perhaps Cusa’s instructions 
to the Tegernsee brothers to synchronically orbit the icon represents 
a kind of return, re-uptake, and re-appropriation of the primal ‘vitality 
dynamics’34 of infancy out of which emerge higher cognitive capacities – 
for example, capacities to think about (and find oneself astonished by) 
the paradoxes of the concept of infinity.
moreover, the experience that attends this second moment of the 
exercise does indeed appear to be marked by astonishment at just such 
paradoxes. Glimmerings of mystical theology’s term begin to show forth 
from within the ‘felt immediacy’35 of attending and being-attended-to in 
mutual, moving awareness. but this term, it seems, is non-representable: 
‘The abnormality of this persistent gaze brings about the disappearance 
of the possibility of grasping it as one object among others, before or 
after others. The observer thought he was seeing. Changed into the 
observed, he enters into an “astonishment” which is not accompanied 
by any representation. The experience of the gaze is a surprise without 
an object.’36 What does the contemplator contemplate if not an infinite 
coincidenting-of-opposites which he both passively undergoes and 
actively creates? The non-representable but nevertheless real proliferation 
of second-person awarenesses in the ritualistic movement around the 
icon serves to perform, through participation, the mystery to which the 
text attests. As described in this text, the mystery perceived is turning 
out to be inextricably tied to the dynamic and primal I-Thou relations in 
which each contemplator lives and moves and has his being.
(2nd ed.), ed. by Dante Cicchetti and Donald J. Cohen (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc., 1995), pp. 65-126.
33 Trevarthen, ‘The Generation of Human meaning’, pp. 100-101.
34 Trevarthen, ‘The Generation of Human meaning’, p. 74. Cf. Daniel Stern, Forms 
of Vitality: Exploring Dynamic Experience in Psychology, the Arts, Psychotherapy and 
Development (oxford: oxford university Press, 2010).
35 Trevarthen, ‘The Generation of Human meaning’, p. 74. Cf. Stein bråten, The 
Intersubjective Mirror in Infant Learning and Evolution of Speech (Amsterdam: John 
benjamins Publishing Company, 2009).
36 De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’, p. 18.
156 ANDreA HollINGSWorTH
3.3 The Third Phase
If the monks have been duly awestruck by the first two phases of the 
exercise, there is perhaps a danger that the exercise will turn into a theatre 
of the absurd. If meaning is not to disappear in a dark emotional sea of 
wonder, what is needed is some kind of ‘common vision’37 or ‘universal 
viewpoint’38 that can begin to form a bridge of rational understanding 
between the marvelled actors. The third stage, which makes explicit the 
implicit sociality that has undergirded the para-liturgy all along, provides 
this bridge. It repeats the processional movement of the second, but 
adds an element of verbal interpersonal engagement. The brothers are 
instructed to coordinate, once again, their opposed travels around the 
half-circle perimeter of the all-seeing image. but this time, the brothers’ 
bodies will not merely pass each other by; rather, they will stop, turn 
toward each other, and co-testify to the aporiae they have experienced:
let [a brother] have one of his brothers pass across from east to west 
while looking at the icon, as he himself moves from west to east. When 
they meet let him ask the other whether the icon’s gaze continuously 
turns with him, and he will hear that it moves just the same in the 
opposite direction. He will believe [credere] him, but unless he believed 
him, he would not imagine this to be possible. And when he is shown 
this by his brother, he will discover that the face looks unfailingly on 
all who walk before it even from opposite directions. Therefore, he will 
experience that the immobile face ... is moved toward a single place in 
such a way that it is also moved simultaneously toward all places, and that 
it beholds a single movement in such a way that it beholds all movements 
simultaneously.39
The brothers first torque their movements, thereby creating opposition, 
then attune their communications, thereby creating cohesion. In De 
Certeau’s words: ‘The scene of this third moment combines two opposed 
activities which consist, for the partners, in each one doing the opposite of 
the other (inverse trajectories) and then in saying to each other the same 
thing (“You, too? Yes.”). The “doing” stems from a contradictory plurality: 
the “saying”, from a  unifying coincidence.’40 Second-person relating 
makes possible this plurifying and unifying movement – a movement 
37 Ibid., p. 19.
38 mcGinn, ‘Seeing and Not Seeing’, p. 39.
39 DvD, ¶ 3.
40 De Certeau, ‘The Gaze Nicholas of Cusa’, p. 20.
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which, as De Certeau points out, essentially amounts to an enactment of 
Cusa’s doctrine of coincidentium oppositorum.
The brothers’ ‘interpersonally coordinated affective state’41 of wonder 
now becomes explicit as they use language to participate in each other’s 
attitudes. but the encounter goes beyond emotional sharing only; the 
brothers are also mutually engaged in a high-level cognitive act – namely, 
conceptualization of the other’s perspective in relation to the self ’s 
standpoint, along with abstract philosophic reflection on universality 
and particularity, and temporality and eternity. Here it is interesting to 
note that many current SPP/joint attention theorists argue that human 
capacities for higher-order cognition and cultural learning are rooted in 
the more basic, affectively-charged experience of attending jointly with 
others during the first years of life. For example, Tomasello et al. argue 
that the early sharing of emotions, experience, and activities with others 
(‘shared intentionality’) enables human children to build and employ 
dialogic cognitive representations later in life.42 likewise, according 
to Hobson and Hobson, ‘higher functions of human mentality arise 
through the interiorization of interpersonal processes’.43 Henrike moll 
and Andrew N. meltzoff argue that joint attention in the first years of life 
offers the necessary foundation for the development of the later ability 
to take perspectives, including the capacity to understandthe ‘clash’ of 
confronting perspectives.44 In light of such theories,45 the third moment 
41 Hobson and Hobson, ‘Joint Attention or Joint engagement’, p. 116.
42 michael Tomasello, malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya behne, and Henrike moll, 
‘understanding and Sharing Intentions: The origins of Cultural Cognition’, Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 28 (2005), 675-691. Tomasello’s claim that humans are the only 
species to engage in shared intentionality has been significantly discounted by findings 
in primatology. See David A. leavens, ‘Joint Attention: Twelve myths’, in Joint Attention: 
New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. by 
Axel Seeman (Cambridge, mA: The mIT Press, 2011), pp. 43-72.
43 Hobson and Hobson, ‘Joint Attention or Joint engagement’, p. 131.
44 Henrike moll and Andrew N. meltzoff, ‘Joint Attention as the Fundamental basis 
of understanding Perspectives’, in Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, 
Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. by Axel Seeman (Cambridge, mA: The 
mIT Press, 2011), pp. 395-413. moll and meltzoff ’s recent work appears to indicate that 
while children as young as 3 years old can take other people’s visual perspectives, it is not 
until the ages of 4 or 5 that children are able to understand another’s point-of-view of 
an object when it directly confronts their own perspective of the same object. Henrike 
moll, Andrew N. meltzoff, Katharina merzsch, and michael Tomasello, ‘Taking Versus 
Confronting Visual Perspectives in Preschool Children’, Developmental Psychology, 49, 
no. 4 (April 2013), 646-654.
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of Cusa’s exercise witnesses to a  richly integrative and transformative 
experience. At its core there remains the sense of being held within the 
grip of a  loving, life-giving gaze  – an  experience akin to elementary 
preverbal, emotion-based, nonrepresentational46 forms of joint attending 
in infancy. but with the addition of verbal social interaction about others’ 
minds/perspectives, the ritual comes to enact or perform a turn to more 
explicitly attributive, contentful thinking about others’ minds.47 Here 
we have what might be described as an intelligent and adaptive return 
to and performance of the developmental transition from, on the one 
side, the preverbal, emotion-based ‘synrhythms’ of infancy (what Hans 
loewald calls the ‘primary level of mentation’ that precedes awareness 
of distinctions between the inner and the outer, the subjective and 
the objective) to, on the other side, linguistically-mediated, contentful, 
concept-based representations of others’ mental states and subjective 
experiences. The Tegernsee monks’ worries over whether mystical 
knowledge of God is a  matter of being affectively submerged within 
the divine or set at a  noetic remove from the divine are addressed as 
the brothers enact ritualistically the human developmental transition 
from implicit-automatic, ‘affective’ mentalization to explicit-controlled 
‘cognitive’ mentalization.48
If the brothers’ dialogue with each other represents explicit thought 
and speech about the content of each others’ experience – that is, if the 
conversation is about something that is, in some sense, objective – then 
we need to inquire as to what that thing might be. What, indeed, is the 
45 All of which are connected to the idea of neural ‘re-use’ in which brain circuits 
initially established for one cognitive purpose can be put to different uses later on. 
michael l. Anderson, ‘Neural reuse: A  Fundamental organizational Principle of the 
brain’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, no. 4 (2010), 245-266.
46 Daniel D. Hutto proffers a theory he calls ‘radical enactivism’ by which he seeks 
to defend the existence of (and explain the developmental salience of) such early 
nonrepresentational forms of ‘mind minding’. See Daniel D. Hutto, ‘elementary mind 
minding, enactivist-Style’, in Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy 
of Mind, and Social Neuroscience, ed. by Axel Seeman (Cambridge, mA: The mIT Press, 
2011), pp. 307-341.
47 Developmentally speaking, this transition usually happens between ages three 
and five, and is, as Hutto argues, likely mediated by language acquisition. Daniel D. 
Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons 
(Cambridge, mA: mIT Press, 2012).
48 Peter Fonagy and Patrick luyten, ‘A Developmental, mentalization-based Approach 
to the understanding and Treatment of borderline Personality Disorder’, Development 
and Psychopathology, 21, no. 4 (2009), 1355-1381.
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experience that is being reciprocally witnessed to and believed in this 
third phase of the ritual? The preface’s instructions read: ‘When they 
meet let him ask the other whether the icon’s gaze continuously turns 
with him, and he will hear that it moves just the same in the opposite 
direction.’49 The content of the conversation is, then, the experience of the 
infinite gaze as mediated by the icon while one is moving (with others). 
but is this experience contentful in any real sense? Is it something that can 
be talked about? Not really. As we have seen, the experience of the gaze is 
deeply ambiguous – it is a kind of non-objectifiable relational dynamism. 
What, moreover, has conditioned the possibility of this non-objectifiable 
relational dynamism? Precisely second-person relatedness, as previously 
discussed. What all of this means is that when the actors communicate 
about the experience  – when they bear witness to one another and 
believe one another – they are, in fact, relating second-personally with 
reference to an experience of relating second-personally. That is to say, 
the positive content of the brothers’ shared attending is itself the mystery 
that emerged from their prior experience of shared attending. like two 
mirrors faced together, the brothers reflect the limitless back to one 
another as they mutually testify and mutually believe.
3.4 Summarizing the Preface’s Three Phases in Light of the SPP
In the three phases of the exercise in DvD’s preface, rich and multilayered 
second-person relatedness integrates and transforms motifs common in 
Platonically-inspired streams of Christian thought (e.g., the perspective 
shift, the similitude/image, the gaze, the reflection, the face, the mirror). 
This transformation results in a  liturgical performance which leads 
exercitants into an  experience of coincidentia oppositorum and docta 
ignorantia – one that is mediated, I suggest, by a kind of ritualized re-
entrance into the developmental cradle of human consciousness wherein 
distinctions between emotion and cognition, and subject and object, are 
only just beginning to dawn. Cusa’s reader/hearers are invited to learn 
ignorance by re-entering the relational primordiality of infancy, the 
cradle of the self ’s emergence with all its varieties of chaos and genesis. 
The embodied relational rhythms of infancy, inasmuch as they give rise 
to the neurocognitive architecture that structures selfhood, represent 
a kind of zenith of ‘possibility’ with regard to human life: at no other 
49 DvD, ¶ 3.
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point in the lifespan is synaptic growth and bio-psycho-social-emotional 
development more intense or more important. To re-enter through ritual 
the relational patterns of infancy is to re-enter the space of possibility 
out of which the self emerged. Contra Freud, such re-entrance is not 
regressive but rather, I think, adaptive: ‘It seems that there are a variety 
of ways in which evolution has allowed living creatures to outwit 
Darwinian pressures and “have a life” after all’, writes robert bellah. ‘It 
may even turn out that it is “functional” to have spheres of life that are 
not functional [...] What are sometimes called “offline” activities, like 
sleep, play, and worship, may in fact turn out to be adaptive.’50
The brothers at St. Quirin had wondered about the nature of the 
‘highest capability of the mind’ [synderesis] by which the devout soul 
attains unto God.51 The attainment unto God via the highest capability 
of the mind cannot be described with propositions, Cusa seems to 
reply; however, if you experience yourself being (re)created, moment-
by-moment, in and through the dynamisms of the I-thou encounter, 
perhaps you will experience union with Posse Ipsum, possibility itself.
In DvD’s preface, sharing awareness of the sharing of the focus 
furnishes the Tegernsee monks with an  embodied experience that 
becomes symbolic of or contemporaneous with the infinite divine visio 
whose reality is both felt and cognized, and can be neither objectified 
nor dissolved. In the main text of DvD – which is written in the form 
of a  prayer, reminiscent in many ways of Augustine’s Confessions  – 
Cusa continues to shepherd his readers/hearers down the path of the 
coincidence of opposites to the place of learned ignorance and on 
into the dark luminescence of a vision of God – a vision he hopes can 
perhaps quiet (even if it does not completely resolve) the conundrum of 
whether God can be a term of human apprehension, and whether such 
apprehension, if possible in this life, happens through knowledge, love, 
or both. Throughout the treatise, what would today be called the SPP 
remains influential. However, it is the preface’s richly relational ritual 
which sets the brothers’ feet on the mystical theological path in the 
first place, underscoring how this path, and second-person relatedness 
generally, has to be known subjectively rather than merely known about 
objectively.
50 robert N. bellah, Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age 
(Cambridge, mA: belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 2011), pp. xx, xxii.
51 Vansteenberghe, ‘la correspondence de Nicolas de Cuse’, p. 110.
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IV. CoNCluSIoN
ernst Cassirer has shown how renaissance artistic and scientific 
sensibilities gave rise to new complications in the relationship between 
knowing subject and known object in 13th – 16th c. europe. on the one 
hand, ‘only by maintaining a distance between [subject and object] can 
we possibly have a sphere for the aesthetic image and a sphere for logical-
mathematical thoughts.’52 on the other hand, these very aesthetic images 
and logical-mathematical thoughts deeply challenged the reigning 
Aristotelian-Scholastic cosmos with its fixed places and measurements, 
emphasizing instead the relativity of local determination and pressing 
thought in the direction of absolute form: ‘every part of the cosmos is 
what it is only in connection with the whole [...] what manifests itself in 
movement is [...] this mutual relationship of things, their own immanent 
“reality”.’53 Where did the human subject fit within this new world of 
infinite dynamism and relative perspective?
As the renaissance individual observed the world and gave it meaning, 
he manifested both his immersion within and his transcendence from 
it: ‘The infinity of the cosmos threatens [...] to annihilate [the ego] 
completely; but the same infinity seems also to be the source of the ego’s 
constant self-elevation, for the mind is like the world that it conceives.’ 
54 In ways not unlike renaissance artists and philosophers of nature for 
whom contemplation of the cosmos was now self-destroying, now self-
elevating, renaissance-era mystics like the brothers of St. Quirin found 
themselves perplexedly fascinated by questions about the shape and 
effects of devotional engagement with mystical theology’s divine object. 
Cassier’s comment that the renaissance man, ‘like Goethe’s Ganymede 
[...] confronts the divinity and the infinite universe as both “captor and 
captive”’55 would seem to apply equally to the Tegernsee monks in their 
contemplative confrontation with God.
Cusa’s DvD speaks directly to this subject-object problem as it bore 
upon Christian spirituality and theology. In the treatise overall, and the 
preface especially, the Tegernsee monks are offered something that is not 
really an answer to the problem in any straightforward sense, but rather, 
an  experiential heightening and intensifying of the paradoxes that 
52 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos, p. 170.
53 Ibid., p. 180.
54 Ibid., p. 190.
55 Ibid., p. 191.
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constitute the problem itself – one designed, moreover, to effect its own 
unique kind of resolution through transformation. For Cusa, the object 
of theology is not a substance or essence, but living dynamism – creative 
enfolding [complicatio] and unfolding [explicatio] in which the world’s 
perduring subsists. Cusa’s God is unavailable except as God acts; this 
God is Posse Ipsum – pure possibility, wellspring of being, discernable 
only through a learned unknowing that comes by way of a confrontation 
with absolute contradiction. The coincidentium oppositorum is ‘the 
way God works’,56 it is the mode by which God creates. Therefore, to 
know God, one must experience coherence without elision; one must 
understand what it means for there to exist radically separate and ever 
shifting perspectives that are, nevertheless, radically conjoined because 
mutually constitutive; one must intuit the inherent co-constitution 
of emotion and cognition in human experience. most importantly, 
one must learn to indwell possibility itself. If second-person oriented 
psychology and neuroscience is right to posit that the experience of 
being addressed by others prepares human motor responses to pick up 
and respond to possibilities for action and interaction,57 then it should 
not come as a surprise that Cusa, to inform the Tegernsee brothers of the 
nature of mystical union with Posse Ipsum, drew so deeply from the wells 
of primordial human relational experience.
The benedictine brothers at Tegernsee had wished for an explanation 
of Cusa’s doctrine of coincidentium oppositorum that was salient for their 
devotional life, that addressed the issue of whether or not God is object 
of one’s contemplation, and that spoke to the problem of how knowledge 
and love are related in the mystical journey toward union with God. 
What is remarkable is that the exercise they received in DvD’s preface, 
which was apparently intended to allow them to experience the answers 
holistically, corresponds closely to phenomena described in terms of 
second-person relatedness today. Cusa, in setting his theo-philosophical 
proposals on the scaffold of the I-thou relation, effectively socializes, 
somaticizes, and emotionalizes the more abstract, mathematically-
oriented, propositionally-articulated theology of coincidence he had 
previously set forth in De Docta Ignorantia. Cusa’s experientially-attuned 
and relationally-structured meditation in DvD’s preface allows him to 
communicate in a  clear, existentially-salient, and body-involving way 
56 bond, ‘Introduction’, p. 45.
57 Schilbach et al., ‘Toward a Second-Person Neuroscience’, p. 402.
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his nuanced theological epistemology and metaphysic. The content 
of his teaching is something akin to this: like the experience of the 
second-person perspective, the experience of mystical theology’s divine 
term is enigmatic (resisting objectification); dynamic (enactive and 
participatory); integrative (interweaving cognition and emotion); and 
transformative (self-creative and self-forming).
In DvD’s preface, Nicholas of Cusa showcases ways in which 
a second-personally suffused yet philosophically sophisticated mystical 
theology is able to fold speculative concepts into a rich socio-emotional 
phenomenological field. As such, this interpretation also shows how the 
second-person perspective can shed new light on mystical texts of the 
past that have enduring relevance for the philosophy of religion today.58
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